University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Accounting Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

5-2010

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting
Irregularities
Christopher S. Armstrong
University of Pennsylvania

Alan D. Jagolinzer
David F. Larcker

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Armstrong, C. S., Jagolinzer, A. D., & Larcker, D. F. (2010). Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and
Accounting Irregularities. Journal of Accounting Research, 48 (2), 225-271. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
j.1475-679X.2009.00361.x

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/63
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities
Abstract
This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation
provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this
important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity
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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities
Abstract: This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings
and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior
studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence
of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question.
Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research
design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias
within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive
association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on
the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence
that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher
levels of equity incentives.
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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

1. Introduction
This study examines the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives
and accounting irregularities (e.g., restatements, Securities and Exchange Commission
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, and shareholder class action lawsuits).
Although equity holdings may alleviate certain agency problems between executives and
shareholders, concerns have arisen among researchers, regulators, and the business press that
“high-powered” equity incentives might also motivate executives to manipulate accounting
information for personal gain. This view assumes that stock price is a function of reported
earnings and that executives manipulate accounting earnings to increase the value of their
personal equity holdings. 1 If this allegation is true and the economic cost of accounting
manipulation is large, this idea has important implications for executive-compensation contract
design and corporate monitoring by both internal and external parties.
Although at least ten recent studies have examined the relationship between equity incentives
and various types of accounting irregularities, no conclusive set of results has emerged from this
literature. Eight prior studies find evidence of a positive relationship, but even within this group
the evidence is mixed with regard to which components of an executive’s equity incentives (e.g.,
restricted stock, unvested options, and vested options) produce this association. Two additional
studies do not find evidence of a relationship, even though they share similar proxies and
samples with studies that do find a relationship.

1

This view implicitly ignores (or considers as trivial) the effect of executive ethics, actions by monitors, and
executives’ expected costs associated with manipulation. This view also requires that the market is unable to
distinguish between “true” and manipulated earnings.
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Most prior studies adopt a research design that relies heavily on assumptions about the
functional form of the relationship between accounting irregularities and equity incentives (as
well as whatever control variables are used in the study). Specifically, these studies match firms
on the outcome variable of interest (e.g., a firm that experienced accounting fraud is matched
with a firm that did not experience fraud during the same period) using a small number of
variables such as firm size and industrial classification. Other potential confounding variables
are “controlled” through their inclusion in an estimation equation that relates accounting
irregularities to equity incentives. Although common in empirical research, this research design
relies on a variety of restrictive and perhaps unrealistic assumptions to produce reliable
inferences.
Prior studies have also tended to analyze a relatively small sample of firms that lie in the
intersection of the Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database and either Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Financial Statement Restatements or U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Since
ExecuComp does not provide data for the majority of firms in the economy, it is possible that the
results of prior studies are influenced by selection bias. 2 Moreover, it is not clear whether small
samples (e.g., between 50 and 200 observations) provide sufficient statistical power for an
analysis of the determinants of a relatively rare event such as a major accounting manipulation.
This uncertainty hinders the ability to draw inferences regarding the primary research hypothesis
when a statistically significant relationship is not detected. Finally, prior studies have generally
ignored the likely endogenous matching of executives with their observed compensation
contracts and, thus, their observed level of equity incentives. Since this type of endogenous

2

Studies using ExecuComp data may be prone to selection bias concerns, since ExecuComp focuses exclusively on
firms listed in the Fortune 1500 (e.g., Cadman et al., 2006).
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matching is an important feature of the executive labor market, it is difficult to interpret prior
results, because the reported parameter estimates are likely to be biased.
We draw inferences regarding the relationship between CEO equity incentives and
accounting irregularities from a broad data set and use a research design that better addresses the
potential confounds inherent in observational studies (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum,
2002). To reduce the potential for “overt bias,” we employ a propensity-score matched-pair
research design to join observations that are similar along a comprehensive set of firm- and
manager-level dimensions. 3 The propensity-score method forms matched pairs of CEO firmyears that have similar contracting environments but differing levels of CEO equity incentives.
This approach alleviates misspecification that occurs when the research design assumes an
incorrect functional form for the relationship between the variables of interest (including
controls) and the outcome.
We also assess the sensitivity of our results to “hidden bias,” or unobserved correlated
omitted variables, using the bounding techniques developed by Rosenbaum (2002). This
bounding approach provides insight into the likelihood that our results are confounded by
explanations such as endogenous matching of CEOs and equity incentives on the basis of
unobserved variables such as the level of CEO risk aversion. Thus, our research design relaxes
the assumptions of the traditional matched-pairs approach and assesses the impact of omittedvariable and endogeneity concerns.
In contrast to most prior studies, we do not observe a positive relationship between CEO
equity incentives and the incidence of accounting irregularities. Instead, our evidence suggests
3

Rosenbaum (2002) defines overt bias as “one that can be seen in the data at hand,” which means that it is bias that
is related to observable variables. It can result from either omission of observable variables or from the specification
of an improper functional form for the relationship between observable variables and the outcome variable of
interest. In contrast, “hidden bias” is associated with the omission of unobservable variables (i.e., correlated omitted
variables). We consider both types of bias in our analysis.
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that the level of CEO equity incentives has a modest negative relationship with the incidence of
accounting irregularities. This result is more consistent with the notion that equity incentives
reduce agency costs that arise with respect to financial reporting, than is the interpretation that
equity incentives cause managers to manipulate reported earnings.
Although we provide only one substantive application, propensity-score methods can (and
perhaps should) be applied to other empirical accounting studies in which the hypothesized
causal variable is an endogenous choice by managers, boards of directors, or other similar
parties. In particular, using propensity scores to generate matched pairs with maximum variation
in the causal variable of interest while minimizing the variation in the controls is, in many cases,
a superior econometric approach to matching on the outcome variable and relying on a linear or
some other assumed functional form to control for confounding variables. Moreover,
propensity-score methods also enable the researcher to explicitly quantify the sensitivity of the
results for the primary causal variable to unobserved correlated omitted variables.
Section 2 of this paper reviews the prior literature examining the relationship between
executive incentives and accounting irregularities. Section 3 describes the sample and our
primary measurements. Section 4 discusses the propensity-score matched-pair research design
and compares this approach with the regression research design that is common in prior studies.
Section 5 presents our primary empirical results. Section 6 discusses sensitivity analyses.
Section 7 provides concluding remarks. Finally, Appendix A includes basic methodological
background regarding observational studies and Appendix B discusses the importance of
functional form when selecting regression or matching approaches for inference.

2. Prior Research

6

At least ten recent studies (summarized in Table 1) examine the relationship between
accounting irregularities and executives’ equity incentives. These studies generally hypothesize
that equity-based compensation and holdings provide incentives for managers to manipulate
accounting numbers (e.g., Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007;
Bergstresser and Phillipon, 2006), perhaps to increase gains from pending insider sales (Cheng
and Warfield, 2005). Harris and Bromiley (2007), for example, suggest that the likelihood of
managerial impropriety rises with “the strength of inducements” and therefore test for a positive
relationship between the probability of accounting misrepresentation and stock-option
compensation. Few studies (e.g., O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, and Gilley, 2006; Burns and
Kedia, 2006), however, explicitly consider the alternative possibility that equity incentives might
instead lessen management’s desire to manipulate accounting numbers by aligning managers’
interests with those of shareholders.
Eight of the ten papers listed in Table 1 find some evidence that executives’ equity incentives
exhibit a positive statistical association with accounting manipulation. Although the results of
these studies might be considered as a consensus for this research question, there is considerable
variation across inferences presented within these papers. This lack of consistency occurs even
though similar proxies for accounting manipulation and equity incentives are used and there is
considerable cross-sectional and temporal overlap in their samples. For example, Johnson, Ryan,
and Tian (2009) and Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) both assess the relationship between
the incidence of accounting fraud (identified using AAERs) and the equity portfolio delta
computed for top firm executives. 4 Although the two samples exhibit considerable overlap,
Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) report evidence of a strong positive association between

4

Equity portfolio delta is the change in the (typically risk-neutral) dollar value of an executive’s equity portfolio
(stock, restricted stock, and stock-option holdings) for a 1% change in the price of the underlying stock.
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unrestricted equity holdings and the incidence of accounting fraud, while Erickson, Hanlon, and
Maydew (2006) do not observe any statistical association. Similarly, Baber, Kang, and Liang
(2007) and Harris and Bromiley (2006) both examine the relationship between equity incentives
and the incidence of accounting restatements. Their samples differ in the number of
observations but overlap completely in observation years. In spite of this overlap, the studies
report surprisingly different results. Harris and Bromiley (2006) find a positive association
between the incidence of accounting restatements and the ratio of option compensation to total
compensation, while Baber, Kang, and Liang (2007) do not find a similar statistical association.
Some prior studies provide evidence of a positive association only for certain components of
option-related holdings (e.g., Harris and Bromiley, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi,
Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007). Others provide evidence of a positive association for different
equity components, such as unvested options and stock ownership (Cheng and Warfield, 2005),
vested stock holdings (Johnson, Ryan, and Tian, 2009), and the entire equity portfolio
(Bergstresser and Phillipon, 2006). Yet another study finds evidence of a positive association for
option-related equity components only when conditioned on the Board of Directors’ composition
and compensation structure (O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, and Gilley, 2006). These
inconsistencies highlight the difficulty in drawing general inferences regarding the association
between equity incentives and accounting irregularities from prior research.

3. Sample and Measurement Choice

8

Our sample of CEO equity incentives, measured between 2001 and 2005, is obtained from a
comprehensive database provided by Equilar, Inc. 5 This database is similar to ExecuComp’s in
that it provides executive-compensation and equity-holdings data collected from annual proxy
filings (DEF 14A) with the SEC. However, the Equilar data provides 3,634, 3,930, 4,043, 4,051,
and 4,047 CEO-firm observations (in contrast with the roughly 1,500 CEO-firm observations
available annually from ExecuComp) across fiscal years 2001 to 2005, respectively. 6
It is difficult to construct an appropriate empirical measure for the incidence of accounting
manipulation, since this managerial action is unobserved. Most empirical studies infer
manipulation from observing “extreme” outcomes in which manipulation is likely to have
occurred (e.g., incidences of accounting restatements and regulatory or legal action). One
concern with this measurement method is that it incorrectly classifies firms that manipulate
accounting but that are not identified for restatement or for regulatory or legal action. The
potential for misclassification is a limitation of our study as well as of previous studies in this
area.
To reduce the risk of misclassification, we consider three different types of “accounting
irregularities.” The first is financial restatements related to accounting manipulation. These data
are obtained from Glass-Lewis & Co., which comprehensively collects restatement information
from SEC filings, press releases, and other public data. We identify accounting restatements
between 2001 and 2005 that relate to perceived reporting manipulation classified as accounting
fraud, an SEC investigation, a securities class action suit, improper reserve allowances, improper
5

The period 2001-2005 overlaps with regulatory environment changes (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Regulation FD,
SEC Rule 10b5-1) that may affect inferences relative to those reported in studies that examine earlier periods. We
assess the sensitivity of our inferences to time-period choice in Section 6.4.
6
The total of 19,705 pooled observations is the maximum number of CEO-firm-years available from Equilar.
Eliminating observations with missing analysis data yields 13,706 pre-match CEO-firm-year observations.
Requiring one-year-ahead data yields 10,773 CEO-firm-year observations for the propensity-score estimation. The
propensity-score matching algorithm yields a primary analysis sample of 9,118 CEO-firm-year observations (4,559
matched pairs).
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revenue recognition, or improper expense recognition. 7 We code a restatement incident as the
first fiscal year in which improper accounting occurred that subsequently necessitated a
restatement. As shown in Table 2 (Panel A), we identify 464 restatement incidents (3.4% of the
total sample) across the time period covered in our analysis, with the most observations
occurring during fiscal year 2004.
The second accounting irregularity we consider is whether the firm was accused of
accounting manipulation in a class action lawsuit. We identify these firms in a database
provided by Woodruff-Sawyer and Co. that records class action lawsuit damage periods between
2001 and 2005. The lawsuits allege disclosure or financial-statement earnings estimate
improprieties, financial misrepresentation, failure to adhere to GAAP, or restatement of
earnings. 8 We code a lawsuit incident as the first fiscal year in which the firm is named in a
lawsuit damage period. We identify 464 incidents of accounting-related lawsuit allegation
periods (3.4% of the total sample) across the time period, with the most observations occurring
during fiscal year 2001 (Table 2, Panel A).
The final accounting irregularity we consider is whether the firm was accused of accounting
manipulation in an AAER from the SEC. We identify these firms from the comprehensive
AAER listing provided on the SEC website for allegation periods between 2001 and 2005 that
allege earnings-estimate improprieties, financial misrepresentation, or failure to adhere to

7

Revenue recognition restatements may result from changes in GAAP or GAAP enforcement (e.g., Staff
Accounting Bulletin 101). We classify these restatements as “manipulation,” since many GAAP enforcement
changes resulted from regulatory perception that revenue was being misreported. For sensitivity, we also restrict our
restatement sample to the subsample of Glass-Lewis restatements that note revenue recognition, expense
recognition, or concerns over reserves and allowances (Palmrose et al., 2004) and also note a material weakness, a
late filing, an auditor change, or a restatement via 8-K filing. Results for this restricted restatement sample are
qualitatively similar to our reported results.
8
Woodruff-Sawyer and Co. collects comprehensive class action lawsuit data to help estimate premiums for
brokering directors and officers’ liability insurance. A class action damage period is the period that precedes the
lawsuit filing date during which the plaintiff alleges that damages (e.g., accounting manipulation) had occurred.
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GAAP. 9 We code an AAER incident as the first fiscal year in which the SEC alleges that
accounting manipulation occurred, as detailed in the Enforcement Release. Table 2 (Panel A)
shows that there were only 157 incidents of accounting-related AAER allegation periods (1.2%
of the total sample) across the time period, indicating that AAERs occur much less frequently
than do both accounting restatements and accounting-related litigation. 10
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew,
2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006), we measure CEO equity incentives as the portfolio delta, defined
as the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the CEO’s equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the
firm’s stock price. The value of stock and restricted stock is assumed to change dollar-for-dollar
with changes in the price of the underlying stock. The value of stock options is assumed to
change according to the option’s delta, which is the derivative of its Black-Scholes value with
respect to the price of the underlying stock (Core and Guay, 2002). 11
Since we are concerned with economically substantive differences in the level of equity
incentives among executives, we partition equity incentives into five quintiles for our analyses.
Using quintiles also allows us relax the assumption that CEO equity incentives have a monotonic

9

We define an enforcement action allegation period as the period that precedes the AAER filing date during which
the SEC alleges that accounting manipulation had occurred. For most AAER filings, the allegation period involves
several years that well precede the AAER filing date. It is common, for example, to observe 2007-year filings that
refer back to allegation windows that occur between 2001 and 2005.
10
Untabulated results show that all three measures display a positive contemporaneous correlation. In particular, the
Pearson correlation between (i) restatements and AAERs is 0.07, (ii) restatements and litigation is 0.10, and (iii)
AAERs and litigation is 0.21. All three are highly statistically significant (p < 0.001 using a two-tailed test). There
are 64 CEO-firm-year observations that experience both restatement and litigation events, 27 observations that
experience both restatement and AAER events, 55 observations that experience both litigation and AAER events,
and 13 observations that experience all three events contemporaneously.
11
The parameters of the Black-Scholes formula are calculated as follows. Annualized volatility is calculated using
continuously compounded monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 12 months of returns). The
risk-free rate is calculated using interpolated interest rate on a Treasury note with the same maturity (to the closest
month) as the remaining life of the option multiplied by 0.7 to account for the prevalence of early exercise.
Dividend yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past 12 months scaled by the stock price at the beginning
of the month. This is essentially the same method described by Core and Guay (2002).
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association with accounting irregularities. 12 Quintile rankings also exhibit better measurement
properties than continuous incentive measurements do, since the empirical distribution of CEO
portfolio deltas is right-skewed (Table 2, Panel B).
Figure 1 presents frequency histograms for both contemporaneous and one-year-ahead
accounting irregularities partitioned by CEO equity-incentives quintile. Consistent with results
from prior literature, Figure 1 provides some evidence of a positive (univariate) relationship
between CEO equity incentives and the incidence of accounting irregularities, with the strongest
monotonic pattern appearing for AAER and lawsuit outcomes. Rank correlations (untabulated)
confirm that AAERs (coefficient = 0.023, p-value = 0.0070) and lawsuits (coefficient = 0.052, pvalue = <0.0001) have a statistically positive association with CEO equity incentives. However,
equity incentives are correlated with many characteristics of executives’ contracting
environments that could also produce univariate patterns similar to those in Figure 1.

4. Research Method
Since a pure experiment with random assignment is typically infeasible, most empirical
accounting studies are observational in nature. There is an extensive literature in econometrics
and statistics that identifies conditions necessary to make causal statements in an observational
study about the impact of the treatment variable (CEO equity incentives) on the outcome
(accounting irregularities). We summarize the theoretical framework in Appendix A.
Prior research typically selects a set of firms with an observed accounting irregularity and
then obtains another firm without an irregularity that is matched on year, industry, and size. 13
12

Relaxing the monotonicity assumption also allows us to better isolate the location of any association between
equity incentives and accounting irregularities on the support of the equity-incentives distribution. In the extreme
case, there could be a positive association at one end (e.g., high incentives) and a negative association at the other
end (e.g., low incentives), and these separate effects would be obscured in a model that imposes monotonicity in the
relationship.
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The effect of incentives on the frequency of accounting irregularities is then inferred from the
estimated coefficient on equity incentives. Other variables are “controlled” through their
inclusion in the regression estimation.
The validity of this common research design relies on several critical assumptions. As
discussed more fully in Appendix B, the partial-matched econometric method produces unbiased
parameter estimates only if there is an identical functional relationship between the control
variables and the outcome variable for each level of treatment. 14 If instead the true relationship
between the controls and the outcome variable either differs across levels of treatment or is
inconsistent with the functional form imposed by the research design, the partial-matched
econometric method will produce biased parameter estimates. Further, this misspecification
increases the likelihood of drawing an erroneous conclusion about the existence of a causal effect
of the treatment.
We adopt an alternative approach that is more robust to misspecification of the functional
form of the underlying relationship between equity incentives and accounting irregularities.
Specifically, we use a matched-pair research design that matches a treatment firm with a control
firm that is similar across all observable relevant variables. Our matching algorithm uses the
common partial-match variables plus all other variables that would typically be included as
control variables. Matching on these additional variables relaxes the assumption of a constant
13

Most prior studies match on differences in the outcome rather than on differences in the treatment. The
distinction between the two alternative research designs has important inferential implications, since only the latter
isolates the relationship of interest. Because matching on the outcome does not remove variation in control
variables, the research design implicitly searches for any cause(s) of an effect. In contrast, to the extent it is possible
to achieve covariate balance, matching on the treatment removes variation in other potentially confounding variables
to isolate the effect of a treatment of interest. Further, matching on the outcome has two key limitations. First,
inferences from this design rely heavily on the assumed functional form of the relationship (see Appendix B).
Second, this design may induce low power, since it does not ensure that variation remains in the treatment variable
of interest (see Section 6.3). In contrast, matching on the treatment is analogous to a randomized experiment in
which the randomized treatment assignment deliberately induces variation in treatment.
14
Logistic regression, for example, assumes that a linear functional relationship exists between the log of the odds
ratio and the observable predictor variables.
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functional relationship with the outcome variable and therefore is robust to misspecification of
the functional form (see Appendix A).
4.1 Implementation of the Propensity-Score Matched-Pairs Design
Our matched-pair research design consists of five steps. First, we estimate an ordered
logistic propensity-score model, which is the probability that an executive will receive a certain
level of equity incentives (i.e., the treatment) conditional on observable features of the
contracting environment. Second, we form matched pairs by identifying the pairings that result
in observations with the smallest propensity-score differences (i.e., the most similar observed
contracting environments) but the greatest difference in actual CEO equity incentives (i.e., the
most dissimilar contracts). Third, we examine the covariate balance between the treatment and
control samples and (if necessary) remove the most dissimilar matched pairs to achieve better
control for potentially confounding factors. 15 Fourth, we examine the relationship between
equity incentives and accounting irregularities by assessing whether the frequency of accounting
irregularities is significantly different between the treatment and control groups. Fifth, we
estimate the sensitivity of reported results to potential hidden bias by relaxing the assumption
that matched observations have an equal probability of receiving a certain level of treatment
conditional on the observable contracting environment (Rosenbaum, 2002). The final step
explicitly acknowledges that unobservable contracting characteristics can affect each executive’s
level of equity incentives (e.g., endogenous matching of executives and contracts on
unobservable firm and CEO characteristics such as CEO risk aversion). This assessment

15

It is important to note that this step is not ad hoc and does not induce estimation bias. This step simply identifies
and then removes matched pairs for which the matching algorithm did not produce an effective covariate match
(without using any information about the outcome variable). Removing these observations alleviates inference
problems that are discussed in Appendix B.
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quantifies the potential impact of this confounding effect on the observed statistical association
between the treatment variable and the outcome.
4.1.1 Propensity-Score Model
One problem with implementing a matched-pair research design is the difficulty of obtaining
proper matches when each observation is characterized by many relevant dimensions (or
covariates). As the number of dimensions increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to find
pairs of observations that are similar along all of these dimensions. Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) develop the propensity score as a way to address this dimensionality problem. In
particular, the propensity score is the conditional probability of receiving some level of treatment
given the observable covariates. 16
The treatment of interest in this study is the level of CEO equity incentives, so we require a
propensity-score model of the conditional probability of receiving a certain level of equity
incentives given observable features of a CEO’s contracting environment. Prior theoretical and
empirical research suggests a number of economic and governance characteristics that are
associated with the level of CEO equity incentives, and we draw on this literature to specify the
propensity-score model. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), for example, suggest that larger firms and
firms with greater monitoring difficulties will provide greater CEO incentives. Dechow and
Sloan (1991) suggest that firms with CEO horizon problems will provide greater CEO equity
incentives. Finally, Core et al. (1999) suggest that firm governance characteristics, in part,
determine CEO equity incentives. Therefore, we include proxies for size (market capitalization),
complexity (idiosyncratic risk), growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio), monitoring
16

Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) discuss the necessary conditions for matching on the propensity score (which is a
scalar value) rather than matching on each of the individual covariates. One condition is that the outcome is
independent of the treatment given the observed covariates. A second condition is that the propensity score cannot
perfectly classify observations into the treatment or control groups. This is necessary to ensure that for each
observation, there is a potential match that has a similar probability of receiving the treatment.
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(leverage), CEO horizon problems (CEO tenure), and firm-governance characteristics (e.g., the
number of directors, the number of activist shareholders) in the propensity-score estimation.
We estimate the following ordered logistic propensity-score model, annually, for the CEOs in
our sample:
Pr(EqIncQuint) =

αk
β3
β6
β9
β12
β15
β18

Log(Idiosyncrisk)i
OutsideChmni
StaggeredBdi
PctFoundingDirsi
PctFinExpsAudi
Log(1+NumBlockhldrsi)

(1)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

β1
β4
β7
β10
β13
β16
β19

Leveragei
MkttoBooki
OutsideLdDiri
PctOldOutsDirsi
OutsideDirHoldsi t
DirCompMixi
Log(1 +Activistsi)

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

β2
β5
β8
β11
β14
β17
εi.

Log(MarketCap)i
Log(1 + Tenurei)
CEOApptdOutsDirsi
PctBusyOutsDirsi
Log(1+NumberDirsi)
Log(1+NumInstOwnsi)

+
+
+
+
+

Variables are defined in Appendix C. The independent variables in equation (1) are measured in
the year prior to equity-incentives measurement, and descriptive statistics for these variables are
presented in Table 2 (Panel C). 17
Table 3 reports the aggregated estimates of the annual ordered logistic propensity-score
regression of the level of equity incentives. 18 The first column presents the average of the annual
coefficient estimates, and the second column reports an aggregated z-statistic. 19 The final two

17

Although we select the predictor variables in equation (1) based on prior research, we acknowledge that this
choice process is somewhat arbitrary. An alternative research design would be to include only the traditional
economic determinants of CEO incentives, as opposed to also including corporate governance variables. We
include the governance variables because prior research shows that they are important determinants of the level of
equity incentives (e.g., Core et al., 1999). In addition, if the propensity score only uses economic determinants,
there is a high likelihood that the resulting matches will not be balanced with respect to the governance variables.
This would result in an identification problem which would make it difficult to determine whether the accounting
irregularities are caused by differences in the level of equity incentives, corporate governance, or both.
18
In untabulated sensitivity analyses, we include two-digit SIC code as an additional propensity score estimation
covariate. We also alter the algorithm to require matching from firms with the same two-digit SIC code. Both
procedures produce fewer matches and modestly worse covariate balance across the treatment and control samples,
but neither alters our primary inferences.
19
The aggregated z-statistic is calculated as the sum of the individual annual z-statistics divided by the square root
of the number of years for which the propensity score model is estimated. The construction of this aggregate zstatistic assumes that each of the annual estimates is independent. However, the significance of either the individual
or aggregated results presented in Table 3 does not affect our primary analysis of the relationship between equity
incentives and accounting irregularities since matched pairs are formed annually based on the respective propensity
score model.
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columns report the number of years in which the sign of each annual coefficient estimate is
positive and negative, respectively.
Our results are generally consistent with prior research, in that we find that CEO equity
incentives are greater at larger firms, firms with growth opportunities, and firms with longertenured CEOs. In addition, we find that equity incentives are lower at firms with stronger
monitoring (e.g., outside chairman, lead director, number of institutional shareholders, and
number of activist shareholders). We also observe that equity incentives exhibit a positive
association with the percentage of the outside directors appointed by the CEO, the percentage of
founders on the board, the percentage of shares held by the outside directors, and the degree to
which equity incentives are used to compensate outside directors. Finally, Table 3 indicates that
the propensity-score model has reasonable explanatory power (Adj. Pseudo-R2 = 27.3%). This is
important, since a propensity score with very low explanatory power effectively induces random
matching, which increases the likelihood that inferences will be confounded by correlated
omitted variables.
4.1.2 Matching Algorithm
In the case where a binary treatment is present (i.e., treatment or no treatment), matched pairs
are formed by selecting an observation that received the treatment and selecting another
observation with the closest propensity score that did not receive the treatment. Since we use
CEO equity-incentive quintiles as our treatment, matching becomes an optimization problem of
minimizing a function of the aggregate distances between the propensity scores of the matched
pairs. We follow the approach outlined in Lu et al. (2001) and simultaneously minimize the
difference between propensity scores and maximize the difference between equity-incentive
levels with the following distance metric:
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Δi,j =
Δi,j =

( PScorei − PScore j ) 2

if δi ≠ δj

(δ i − δ j ) 2

if δi = δj,

∞

(2)

PScore is the propensity score computed from equation (1), δ is each observation’s equityincentive quintile, and i, j index the individual observations. 20 We then use a nonbipartite
algorithm to identify, across all possible permutations, the minimum sum of pairwise distances,

∑Δ

i, j for i ≠ j

, where each observation is paired with another and observations can be used only

once for matching (i.e., matching without replacement). 21 In particular, we employ the
nonbipartite matching algorithm suggested by Derigs (1988), which is an “optimal” algorithm in
the sense that it considers the potential distances between other matched pairs when forming a
particular matched pair (Lu et al., 2001).
The distribution of matched pairs according to their pairwise equity-incentive quintiles is
presented in Table 4. The columns indicate the quintile of the treatment observation in each
matched pair, while the rows indicate the quintile of its control counterpart. For example, the
(3,5) element of the matrix is 404, which indicates that there are 404 matched pairs for which the
treatment is in the highest quintile of equity incentives (i.e., five) and the control is in the middle
quintile of equity incentives (i.e., three). The diagonal elements are all zero, since we preclude
matches with identical equity-incentive levels. Not surprisingly, most matched pairs (72.36%)
lie immediately off the diagonal, where the difference in the quintile rank of incentives between
the treatment and control is one. Only 4.96% of the paired observations have a difference of at
20

The distance metric can be generalized to the case where the treatment variable (i.e., denominator) is continuous.
See Hirano and Imbens (2004) for a theoretical discussion and Armstrong, Ittner, and Larcker (2009) and
Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2009) for examples of implementing this approach.
21
It is not clear whether prior studies match with or without replacement. If matching is done with replacement and
the same firm is included in multiple matches, it is necessary to adjust (increase) the standard error used for
statistical tests. Depending on the correlation across matches, this adjustment can be quite large. In general, the
distinction between matching with and without replacement represents a tradeoff of efficiency versus bias.
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least three quintiles. This result indicates that CEOs with similar contracting environments tend
to have similar levels of equity incentives and that the propensity-score estimation method
reasonably predicts CEO equity-incentive levels.
4.1.3. Covariate Balance Between Treatment and Control Samples
Covariate balance is achieved if both the treatment and control groups appear similar along
their observable dimensions except for their level of equity incentives. An adequate degree of
covariate balance is necessary to properly account for the confounding effects of the observed
control variables used to match the observations. If balance is not achieved, it may be necessary
to remove the matched pairs that contributed to the imbalance. 22 Examining covariate balance is
important also because it can highlight potential identification problems. If there is a variable for
which it is not possible to achieve adequate balance across the treatment and control groups, the
treatment effect cannot be identified by the research design. For example, assume that the
treatment group (CEOs with high equity incentives) always consists of larger firms than the
control group (CEOs with low equity incentives). This setting will produce an identification
problem, because any observed difference in outcome between the treatment and control groups
cannot be uniquely attributed to either the treatment or to firm size.
To assess covariate balance between the treatment and control groups, we report both a
parametric t-test of the difference in means and a nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test
of the difference between two distributions. 23 Table 5 presents the means and medians of the
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Although removing observations can improve covariate balance, it may also restrict the range over which the
researcher can make statements about the relationship between the treatment and the outcome of interest. It is only
appropriate to draw inferences from within the overlapping support of the distributions. Inferences from outside this
range are based on extrapolation and rely on an assumption about the functional form of the relationship outside this
range (e.g., linearity).
23
The t-test assumes normality of the data, while the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test
and is sensitive to differences in both the location and shape of the empirical distributions of the samples. Following
Sekhon (2007), we bootstrap the KS test statistic with 2,000 bootstrap samples because “the bootstrapped
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, unlike the standard test, provides correct coverage even when there are point masses in
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treatment and control groups along with the p-values (two-tailed) for both the t-test and the KStest. The p-values for the t-test and KS-test indicate that the matching algorithm was successful
in achieving balance for most covariates. In particular, 19 of the 20 t-tests and 13 of the 20 KStests are not statistically significant (p > 0.05, two-tailed). Moreover, even in the cases in which
the means and medians are statistically different, the economic differences between the treatment
and control sample are very small. Statistical significance appears to occur because we have a
relatively large sample size for these tests. These results suggest that the covariates are generally
balanced across the treatment and control samples and that differences in these observed
variables across the treatment and control groups are not likely to confound our estimates of the
average treatment effect.

5. Results
5.1. Primary Results
Table 6 presents our primary results regarding the relationship between equity incentives and
accounting irregularities. The formal statistical test of this relationship entails examining the
discordant frequency of accounting irregularities that are associated with a particular treatment
level. 24,25 Accounting irregularities are counted for the first year in which an accountingthe distributions being compared.” This is important in our cases, since we include a number of dichotomous
variables in our specification.
24
A pair of observations is concordant if each observation experiences the same outcome and discordant if each has
a different outcome. We assess the significance between the number of concordant and discordant pairs using
McNemar’s (1947) χ2 statistic. With small samples, the McNemar’s χ2 may be misleading and an exact cumulative
binominal test should be used (Liddell, 1983). None of our inferences change when this exact test is used for
evaluating the results in Table 6.
25
When it is not possible to achieve adequate covariate balance, an alternative approach is to form matched pairs
with the propensity scores and then estimate a (conditional logistic) regression of the outcome as a function of
treatment and the vector of control variables used in the propensity-score model (Ho et al., 2007). For sensitivity,
we estimate conditional logistic regressions of accounting irregularities on the level of equity incentives and the
controls that were used in the propensity-score estimation regression. Results (untabulated) are similar to those
reported in Table 6; an outcome that is not surprising given the high degree of covariate balance achieved through
first-stage matching.
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manipulation-related restatement is observed (Panel A), in which the firm is involved in a class
action damage period (Panel B), or in which the firm is involved in an AAER damage period
(Panel C). 26
For each accounting irregularity, we present the results for both the contemporaneous and
one-year-ahead relationship in three ways that take advantage of different amounts of
information about the equity-incentives quintile of the treatment and control observation. First,
we present results according to each possible pairing of equity-incentives quintile. Since there
are five levels of equity incentives and we preclude a matched pair from having an identical level
of equity incentives, there are ten possible combinations for each pair. This is the finest level of
aggregation and preserves information about both the magnitude of the difference in the level of
equity incentives and the location on the support of the equity-incentive distribution. Second, we
group matched pairs according to the difference in equity-incentive quintiles between the
treatment and control observations. This is a more coarse level of aggregation that preserves
information about the difference in the level of equity incentives between the treatment and
control observations but ignores information about their location on the support of the equityincentive distribution (e.g., a 5-3 quintile pair is treated the same as a 3-1 quintile pair because
they both represent a difference of two quintiles between the treatment and control observations).
Third, we pool all of the treatment and control observations and look for differences in the
incidence of accounting irregularities between these two groups. This is the coarsest level of
aggregation and ignores information about both the magnitude and location of the equity
incentives. It considers only whether each observation in a matched pair has a higher or lower
level of equity incentives. It does, however, have the benefit of maximizing the sample size,
26

It is extremely rare for the same firm to appear in multiple discordant pairs. Therefore, correlation across
observations from the same firm is unlikely to induce inference problems. Cross-sectional correlation is also not
likely to induce inference problems, since treatment and control firms are matched in the same year.
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which increases the power of the test. To help assess the economic magnitude of incentive-level
differences between the treatment and control groups, Table 6 also reports $Incent, which is the
median portfolio delta for matched observations reported in the frequency cells. 27
The results presented in Table 6 (Panel A) do not support the notion that higher equityincentive levels are associated with a greater incidence of accounting-related restatements.
There are no instances of statistically larger restatement frequencies for treatment observations
relative to control observations for any comparison. In contrast, we find some modest evidence
consistent with the alternative explanation that equity incentives align managers’ interests with
those of shareholders. When there is a difference of one between the level of equity incentives in
the treatment and control observations (i.e., DiffEqIncQuint = 1), there are 34 (= 119 – 153)
more restatement incidents observed in the subsequent year (p-value = 0.045) for the firms with
lower incentives (control firms) relative to the firms with higher incentives (treatment firms).
The results presented in Table 6 (Panel B) are similar to those in Panel A. We find no
evidence that higher equity incentives are associated with a higher frequency of accountingrelated lawsuits. Instead, the pooled results for contemporaneous and one-year-ahead lawsuit
frequency show more lawsuits for firms with lower incentives relative to firms with higher
incentives (p-value = 0.018 and 0.025, respectively). Looking forward one year, there is also
evidence of fewer lawsuits at firms with lower equity incentives, where the equity incentives
differ by two quintiles (p-value 0.031).
Finally, the results in Table 6 (Panel C), which relates to AAER damage periods, are
consistent with those in Panels A and B. There is no evidence of a positive association between

27

Table 6 reports $Incent only when the difference between equity incentives quintiles is equal to one (and for
pooled data), since this reflects the minimum equity-incentive distance and there is sufficient sample size for tests of
median differences. All treatment-control $Incent differences are statistically significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed) using
a Kruskal-Wallis test.

22

equity incentives and the incidence of AAER damage periods. However, there is evidence that
higher equity incentives are associated with a lower incidence of AAERs. Specifically, when
observations are pooled and when the difference in the level of equity incentives is one or two,
there are more contemporaneous AAERs for the control firms relative to the treatment firms (pvalue = 0.010, 0.070, and 0.066, respectively).
Overall, the results in Table 6 do not provide evidence of a positive association between
equity incentives and the frequency of accounting irregularities. In contrast, there is a modest
negative association between incentives and the frequency of accounting irregularities. Thus,
our results are more consistent with incentive alignment rather than with managerial rent
extraction.
5.2. Hidden Bias Sensitivity
It is well known that the results of non-experimental empirical studies are susceptible to
hidden bias caused by the omission of an unobservable yet relevant variable (i.e., a correlated
omitted variable). Surprisingly, few empirical accounting studies attempt to quantify the
potential effects of hidden bias on their primary conclusions. We use a bounding approach
outlined by Rosenbaum (2002) and DiPrete and Gangl (2004) to assess the sensitivity of our
inferences to potential hidden bias that might exist, because of endogenous matching of
executives and equity-incentive contracts and other similar factors. 28 Rosenbaum (2002) and
DiPrete and Gangl (2004) note that although propensity-score matching effectively alleviates
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It is quite likely that hidden bias is present in this study, as well as the papers summarized in Table 1, because of
selection on unobservables (Heckman and Hotz, 1989). Selection on unobservables occurs when it is not possible to
observe all of the covariates that affect a decision maker’s selection. For example, if certain firms use contracts with
a high level of equity incentives to select more risk-seeking executives and more risk-seeking executives choose
firms that offer riskier compensation packages (with higher equity incentives), there is endogenous matching on
executive risk aversion. If risk-seeking executives are also more likely to manipulate accounting reports, this
endogenous matching on an unobservable variable (i.e., the degree of CEO risk aversion) would induce hidden bias
in our results, and we might misattribute an difference in the frequency of accounting irregularities to differences in
the level of CEO equity incentives, rather than to differences in the degree of CEO risk aversion.
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overt bias relating to observable covariates, it does not remove hidden bias that might arise from
unobserved covariates. Both studies outline an approach to identify the limits at which an
unobservable confounding variable would alter inferences that can be drawn from an analysis
based on only the observed variables.
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that hidden bias exists if two observations (denoted i and j) have
the same observed x covariates but different probabilities (denoted as π) of receiving treatment
because of some unobserved factor. In the case of a binary treatment, the odds that each
observation, i and j, receive treatment are πi/(1−πi) and πj/(1−πj), respectively. Since these two
observations look similar across their observable covariates x, they would be paired by a
matching algorithm to minimize overt bias. If the odds ratio (denoted as Γ by Rosenbaum, 2002)
does not equal one, each observation in a matched pair has an unequal probability of receiving
treatment and there is a hidden bias inherent in the analysis. Rosenbaum (2002) shows that
relaxing the assumption that Γ = 1 (i.e., that two observations with identical observable
covariates have an identical probability of receiving treatment) can be used to compute
significance test boundaries under different assumptions about the strength of the hidden bias
that is necessary to alter the qualitative inferences from a study.
We assess the sensitivity of observed statistically significant results by estimating the
boundary Γ values for cases in which the McNemar’s test p-values exceed 0.10 (two-tailed).
Specifically, in the cases in which there is a statistically significant difference between the
outcomes of the treatment and control groups, we calculate the value of Γ (or the odds ratio) at
which a significance level of 0.10 would be obtained. These Γ values allow us to quantify the
amount of hidden bias necessary to invalidate the statistical significance that results from the
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assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores have an equal probability of
receiving the treatment.
These boundary values are presented (where applicable) in Table 6. We find that there are
several cases in which a statistically significant relationship is observed, yet only a small Γ value
is needed to reduce the statistical significance of the result. 29 This finding suggests that these
results are very sensitive to hidden bias and should be interpreted with caution. For example,
consider the case of one-year-ahead restatements related to accounting manipulation for the 5-4
incentive quintile pairs presented in Panel A of Table 6. In this case, there are 55 restatements
observed from the control group and 31 restatements observed from the treatment group.
Although this difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.013), a value of Γ = 1.37 would
result in a p-value of 0.10. Therefore, this result would be marginally significant (p-value =
0.10) if control firms were actually 1.37 times more (rather than equally) likely to receive lower
equity incentives than treatment firms, after conditioning on observable features of the
contracting environment using the propensity score.
There are also cases in which the observed results are much less sensitive to hidden bias. For
example, Panel C of Table 6 reports nine AAER incidents for the fifth incentive quintile and 29
AAER incidents for the fourth incentive quintile in the contemporaneous AAER estimation (pvalue = 0.002). For this comparison, we find that Γ = 6.26, which provides robust support for the
inference that very high levels of CEO equity incentives minimize AAER frequency.
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To our knowledge, no objective benchmark exists to determine whether a given Γ is “large” or “small.”
Therefore, the designation is subjective and depends on the reader’s prior beliefs as to the degree of endogenous
selection on unobservable factors (e.g., risk-aversion, talent, productivity) in CEO contracting. Larger values of Γ,
however, provide greater confidence that results are robust to hidden bias. Smaller values of Γ indicate that results
are sensitive to hidden bias, thereby confounding inferences from the analysis. Future research should consider
identifying threshold Γ values, perhaps through gathering and evaluating an empirical distribution of Γ values
implicit in other studies. An alternative approach outlined by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) is to express the
degree of selection on unobservable factors relative to the degree of selection on observable factors that would be
necessary to alter the statistical significance of the results.
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Overall, there is mixed evidence on whether results are robust to hidden bias. The most
robust results occur in the higher quintiles of the equity-incentive distribution. As discussed
above, these results also provide some evidence of a negative association between incentives and
irregularities. Thus, the results that appear least sensitive to potential hidden bias are those that
are consistent with an incentive-alignment explanation.

6. Sensitivity Analyses
6.1. Proxy for CEO Equity Incentives
It is possible that our proxy for equity incentives does not adequately measure the degree to
which CEOs’ utility is sensitive to changes in firm value. To assess the sensitivity of our results
to our choice of equity-incentive proxy, we consider an alternative equity-incentive measure,
EqCompMix. This measure is computed as the ratio of the risk-neutral dollar value of options
plus restricted stock compensation to the risk-neutral value of total annual compensation (i.e.,
stock options, restricted stock, salary, bonus, and target long-term incentive-plan payouts). This
(or a similar) incentive measure has been used in prior studies (e.g., Erickson, Hanlon, and
Maydew 2007; Baber et al. 2007). In addition, compensation consultants commonly use equity
mix in their recommendations to the board concerning executive compensation, and it may be a
suitable alternative proxy for managerial incentives. After re-estimating the propensity-score
model, matching algorithm, and primary tests, we find results (untabulated) to be generally
similar to those reported in Table 6.
6.2. Equilar Versus ExecuComp Sample
It is possible that our results are sensitive to sample selection because prior studies generally
use data from larger and more mature firms that comprise the ExecuComp database. To evaluate
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this possibility, we re-estimate our results after constraining the sample to the subset of Equilar
firms that also appear in the ExecuComp database. Our results (not tabulated) are consistent
with those reported in Table 6.
6.3. Econometric Approach
Since the propensity-score matched-pair research design is quite different from the more
traditional outcome-matched logistic regression, it is instructive to examine the sensitivity of our
results to the choice of econometric approach. In Table 7 (Panel A), we report conditional
logistic estimates from an outcome-matched sample. This sample was generated by matching
(without replacement) firms with an accounting irregularity to firms without an accounting
irregularity by year, two-digit SIC code, and total assets. The remaining variables from the
propensity-score estimation (see Table 3) are included as controls. In contrast to the propensityscore results in Table 6, we find little statistically significant evidence of an association between
accounting irregularities and equity incentives. 30
To explore the sensitivity of our results further, Table 7 (Panel B) provides comparative
results of the covariate balance obtained from propensity-score matching with those obtained
from standard partial outcome-based matching. Although it is difficult to make direct
comparisons with prior studies because of differences in sample composition and sample size,
these results show that standard partial outcome-matching generally does not achieve balance for
Leverage and Log(Idiosyncrisk) and often does not achieve balance for MkttoBook. In contrast,
propensity-score matching appears to achieve balance for Leverage and yields generally smaller
median differences for Log(Idiosyncrisk) and MkttoBook across samples. These results at least
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The only statistically significant difference is observed for one-year-ahead AAERs for which the estimated
coefficient for equity quintile three is smaller than both the estimated coefficients for equity quintiles two and four.
These results are mixed and are inconsistent with results in Table 6.
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suggest the possibility that the difference in results between Table 6 and Table 7 is related to the
absence of covariate balance in the outcome-matched sample.
Equally important, covariate balance comparisons clearly show that propensity-score
matching induces considerably more variation in the primary variable of interest, PortDelta.
This is an important distinction, because increasing variation in the treatment variable will
generate more powerful tests of the relationship between equity incentives and accounting
irregularities.
6.4. Time Period
To assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative (earlier) time periods, we compare the
results produced by standard partial outcome-matched logistic regression and the propensity
score using the AAER sample in Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006). In this test, we examine
the association between contemporaneous AAERs and the level of equity incentives. Following
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006), each AAER firm is matched to two firms without an
AAER from the same year, two-digit SIC code, and similar total assets. Although Hosmer and
Lemeshow (2000) show that conditional logistic regression is more appropriate when the sample
if formed by matching on both the dependent and independent variables, we report the results for
both standard logistic and conditional logistic estimation in Table 8. 31 We include control
variables used by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) in this estimation.
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Accounting researchers often cite Maddala (1991) to justify estimation methods regarding limited dependent
variables. In limited dependent variable regressions (e.g., logit or probit) in which observations are matched based
on outcome alone, Maddala (1991) shows that bias is observed only in the intercept. Therefore, in this specific
setting, one can draw unbiased inferences from non-intercept coefficients and can correct for the bias in the intercept
(e.g., King and Zeng, 2001). Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) show, however, that conditional logistic regression is
required to produce appropriate inferences in cases in which observations are matched based on outcome and on
selected control variables. In this specific setting, conditional logistic regression is necessary to account for the lack
of independence between matched pairs in the sample, because pair component observations are not randomly
sampled. When Maddala (1991, p. 790) states that the conditional logit “… is not relevant for the problems in
accounting that we are dealing with,” he is not considering cases in which the sample is formed by matching on both
the dependent and selected independent variables..
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Consistent with Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006), we do not observe evidence of a
relationship between the incidence of AAERs and the level of CEO equity incentives from
estimates produced by standard logistic regression. However, conditional logistic regression
provides some evidence of a positive association between the incidence of AAERs and the level
of CEO equity incentives. The association is most pronounced for CEOs in the highest incentive
quintile and is more consistent with results from several prior studies (Table 1). This finding
also illustrates that inferences from a matched sample are sensitive to the choice of standard or
conditional logistic estimation. 32
Finally, we estimate the results from a propensity-score matched-pair design within this
sample. 33 Similar to the conditional logistic regression results, Table 8 (Panel B) reports
evidence of a positive association between the incidence of AAERs and the level of CEO equity
incentives at the highest level of the equity-incentive distribution. However, in contrast to
conditional logistic results in Table 8 (Panel A), Panel B also reports evidence of a negative
association between the incidence of AAERs and the level of CEO equity incentives at the lowest
level of the equity-incentive distribution. Γ values reported in Panel B indicate that the positive
association observed at the upper end of the equity-incentive distribution is considerably more
sensitive to potential hidden bias relative to the negative association observed at the lower end of
the equity-incentive distribution.
There are two observations worth noting in this analysis. First, results are sensitive to
research design choice and appear to be sensitive to the time period selected. Second, a non32

Although we followed the methods used by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) to select our control sample,
our control sample may differ from theirs. Thus, we cannot make a direct comparison between the results in Table 8
and those in Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006).
33
The CEO incentive propensity score is estimated as a function of the regressors reported in Erickson, Hanlon, and
Maydew (2006). Specifically, EqIncQuint = β1 + β2 CEO=CHAIR + β3 NUMMTGS + β4 FINANCING + β5
LEVERAGE + β6 MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY + β7 ALTMAN’S Z + β8 BOOK TO MARKET + β9 EARNINGS TO
PRICE + β10 RET ON ASSETS + β11 SALES GROWTH + β12 AGE OF FIRM + β13 M&A IN FIRST YEAR OF
FRAUD + β14 STOCK VOLATILITY + β15 CEO TENURE + β16 MISSING CEO TENURE + εi..
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monotonic relationship may exist between equity incentives and accounting irregularities.
Therefore, it is difficult assess the relationship between equity incentives and accounting
irregularities without considering research design choices that relax assumptions regarding the
functional form linking treatment and control variables to the outcome.

7. Conclusion
The widespread use of “high-powered” equity incentives for CEOs and other top executives
has generated interest in assessing whether these incentives align managers’ interests with those
of shareholders or whether they instead induce managers to manipulate accounting information
for personal gain. A number of studies have examined this question, but their evidence is quite
mixed regarding the relationship between equity incentives and various accounting irregularities.
This paper examines this research question using a larger sample that is more representative of
the economy and an econometric approach that better alleviates overt bias and provides an
assessment of hidden bias.
Using a propensity-score matched-pair research design that is robust to misspecification of
the underlying functional form that confounds the traditional logistic regression approaches, we
find little evidence of a positive relationship between CEO equity incentives and the incidence of
accounting-related restatements, shareholder lawsuits alleging accounting manipulation, and
AAERs. If anything, our results suggest that higher equity-based compensation and holdings
may actually reduce the incidence of improper financial reporting. Specifically, we find some
evidence that firms at which the CEO has greater equity incentives have a lower frequency of
accounting irregularities than do firms with similar contracting environments at which the CEO
has a relatively lower level of equity incentives.
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Unlike most prior research, our results are most consistent with the notion that equity
incentives play a role in aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders with regard to
financial reporting. In sensitivity analyses, we find results that are similar when we use CEO
equity mix (rather than portfolio delta) and when we constrain our sample to ExecuComp (rather
than Equilar) firms.
Results generated with a propensity-score matched-pair research design can be quite different
from those produced using standard and conditional logistic regression. Since the propensityscore approach is robust to the functional form linking control variables to the outcome,
propensity-score results provide a better basis for statistical inference about the effect of the
treatment in the absence of precise knowledge about the underlying structural relationship among
the variables of interest. Moreover, the propensity-score approach allows for an explicit
assessment for the sensitivity of the results to hidden bias (e.g., correlated omitted variables).
Finally, there seems to be a temporal aspect for this research question, and this aspect may
account for some of the differences between our results and those of prior research.
One important question that we do not answer is what, if not equity incentives, compels
managers to engage in accounting manipulation. It would be useful for future research to
develop and estimate structural models of managerial decisions regarding accounting
manipulation. At this point, we do not know why executives engage in illegal and unethical
behavior that can result in substantial legal and human-capital costs (e.g., Armstrong and
Larcker, 2009). To gain further insight into this question, future research might consider
behavioral explanations in addition to traditional economic or agency rationalizations.
Manipulative behavior may result from social influence, where other firms, for example,
manipulate accounting and thus allow executives to infer that this behavior is “legitimate.”
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Alternatively, this behavior may be a function of lax ethical norms in the firm or the personal
characteristics of executives engaged in accounting irregularities (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick,
2008). Research in this direction would be likely to enhance our understanding of the accounting
irregularities.
Finally, propensity-score methods should be considered for future empirical accounting
research in which the hypothesized causal variable is an endogenous choice (except, perhaps, in
settings in which the outcome variable is very costly to collect). In particular, researchers should
use propensity-score methods to generate matched pairs that induce maximum variation in the
causal variable of interest (i.e., a full sample match). This approach is consistent with
fundamental research in econometrics and statistics and is an arguably superior econometric
approach to matching on the outcome variable and relying on a regression model to control for
confounding variables (i.e., a partial match). Future research should also consider bounding
methods to explicitly quantify the sensitivity of the results for the primary causal variable to
unobserved correlated omitted variables. This will provide readers with the necessary
information to assess the extent to which reported results are robust to correlated omitted
variable and endogeneity concerns.
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Appendix A. Background for an Observational Study
The potential outcomes framework (Rubin, 1974, 1977; Holland, 1986; Heckman and
Navarro-Lozano ,2004) is useful for illustrating the features of an observational study. Assume
that, for each individual i, there is an indicator Di that equals one if the individual receives the
treatment (e.g., high equity incentives) and equals zero otherwise. For each individual there is a
potential outcome (e.g., accounting irregularity) if the individual receives the treatment, denoted
Y1, and another potential outcome (e.g., no accounting irregularity) if the individual does not
receive the treatment, denoted Y0. The potential outcomes for each individual are defined as Yi =
Yi(Di), and these are a function of both observable (denoted by X) and unobservable outcomespecific covariates (denoted by ε0 and ε1). 34 In the case of additive separability, we can write
these outcomes as follows.
Y1 = μ1(X) + ε1

(A1a)

Y0 = μ0(X) + ε0.

(A1b)

The individual-level treatment effect, Δ = (Y1 – Y0), represents the effect of the treatment on a
particular individual. 35 Although this quantity exists in theory, it cannot be observed because
only one of the two potential outcomes is observed for any particular individual. The outcome
that did not occur (e.g., Y0 if the treatment was not received) is referred to as the “counterfactual”
outcome, and its unobservability creates an identification problem that precludes the
determination of the treatment effect for a specific individual.

34

The unobservable components ε0 and ε1 are indexed separately to allow for the possibility that these factors differ
according to whether treatment was received. If the incidence of treatment is related to unobservables ε0 and ε1, then
there is an endogenous relationship known as selection on the unobservables (Heckman and Robb, 1985), which
results in hidden bias. Below, we discuss how bounds can be established on the size of this relationship relative to
the relationship between the outcome and the observable variables.
35
A treatment effect is often referred to as a “causal effect,” which is defined as the difference between an observed
outcome and its unobserved, counterfactual outcome.
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One way to address this identification problem is to group observations according to whether
they received the treatment and estimate the difference between the average outcomes of the
treatment and control groups (i.e., those that did and did not receive the treatment, respectively),
which can identify the average treatment effect (ATE). One particularly important estimator of
the average treatment effect is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is the
effect of treatment for those individuals who actually receive treatment. 36
ATT = E[Δ | X, D = 1]
= E[Y1 – Y0 | X, D = 1]
= E[Y1 | X, D = 1] – E[Y0 | X, D = 1]
= E[Y1 | X, D = 1] – E[Y0 | X, D = 0].

(A2)

The ATT estimator compares the average outcome for those individuals who received treatment
(Y1) to the average outcome for those individuals who did not receive treatment (which serve as
an estimate of the counterfactual outcome, Y0).
In a matched-pair research design, each observation that received the treatment is paired with
an observation that is similar along all other relevant observable dimensions (i.e., X) but that did
not receive the treatment. Since each matched pair is similar in every observable respect except
that one observation received the treatment while the other did not, any difference in the outcome
can, in the absence of hidden bias, be attributed to the difference in treatment. The average
effect of the treatment is calculated by combining equations (A1a) and (A1b) with equation (A2)
as follows. 37

36

The identifying assumption required to estimate ATT (and, implicitly, used by the matching method to estimate
the ATT) derived by Heckman, et al. (1997) is E[Y0 | X, D = 1] = E[Y0 | X, D = 0] = E[Y0 | X]. This requires that the
expected outcome of those not receiving treatment conditional on the observable covariates X is the same regardless
of whether treatment was received.
37
The second step is based on the assumption that E[ε1 | X, D = 1] = E[ε0 | X, D = 0] = E[ε | X] or that the error is
mean independent of the treatment. This assumption is referred to as “selection on observables” (Heckman and
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E[Y1 – Y0 | X, D] = E[μ1(X) – μ0(X) + ε1 – ε0 | X, D]
= E[μ1(X) + ε1 | X, D = 1] – E[μ0(X) + ε0 | X, D = 0]
= E[μ1(X) | X, D = 1] – E[μ0(X) | X, D = 0]
= E[μ1(X) | X, D = 1] – E[μ0(X) | X, D = 1]
= E[μ1(X) – μ0(X) | X].

(A3)

It is important to note that even if the functional forms of μ1 and μ0 are different, matching on X
will still produce an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect.
An alternative way to develop an estimator of the average treatment effect is to recast
equations (A1a) and (A1b) in a “switching regression” framework (e.g., Roy (1951), Goldfeld
and Quandt (1973), and Rubin (1978)) to yield the following linear model:
Y = Y0 + (Y1 – Y0)D
= α0 + β0X + ε0 + (α1 + β1X + ε1 – (α0 + β0X + ε0))D.

(A4)

If the treatment solely affects the level of the outcome so that there is a homogeneous treatment
effect (i.e., β0 = β1 and ε0 = ε1), this equation simplifies to
Y = α0 + βX + (α1 – α0)D + ε,

(A5)

and the estimated coefficient on the treatment indicator, D, provides an estimate of the treatment
effect (i.e., α1 – α0). This approach assumes a linear relationship between the outcome and
controls. It also assumes that the relationship between the outcome and every control variable is
identical for the treatment and control samples. The implications of violating these assumptions
are developed in Appendix B.

Robb, 1985) because it implies that there are no unobserved factors that affect selection into the treatment and
control groups. As we discuss further below, one way to assess the importance of this assumption is to establish
boundaries on the significance level of the results, to assess the degree to which selection on unobservable variables
would be required to alter the conclusions of the study (Rosenbaum, 2002).
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Appendix B
Comparison of Matching and Regression Approaches
To compare the efficacy of propensity-score matching relative to regression methods
(including partial matching with regression), we rely on Figure B1, which depicts three cases of
the true underlying relationship between Y (the outcome) and X (the observed covariate or
control variable). We assume that the probability density functions for Y given X are distributed
normally with different means and possibly different variances. In the first case (Panel A), both
the treatment and control observations exhibit an identical linear relationship between X and Y.
In the second case (Panel B), both the treatment and control observations exhibit a non-identical
linear relationship between X and Y. In particular, the degree to which treatment affects the
outcome is linear in both the treatment and control samples, but the slopes differ across this
partition. In the third (and perhaps most realistic) case (Panel C), both the treatment and control
observations exhibit a non-identical, non-linear relationship between X and Y. In this setting, the
degree to which treatment affects the outcome may be non-linear for both the treatment and
control groups, and the functional form of the relationship differs across this partition.
Perhaps because of perceived difficulty in identifying an appropriate match across multiple
dimensions, researchers often use a partial match with regression-controls research design. In
this design, researchers match observations along only a few dimensions (e.g., year, industry,
and size) and then “control” for other dimensions by including additional variables in a
regression analysis (e.g., structure of the board of directors). Inferences from this research
design (or from a regression without matching), however, rely on potentially unrealistic,
stringent assumptions about the underlying relationship between the outcome variable and the
“control” variables. If these assumptions are not satisfied, inferences are likely to be
confounded. Consider, for example, a setting in which two firms are matched on size and
41

industry membership and for which there is an additional covariate (e.g., board size) that is
expected to be related to the outcome of interest. If the researcher pools observations, includes a
treatment indicator, D, and estimates a linear regression of this relationship, the estimation model
resembles:
Yi = α + γDi + βXi + ε,

(B1)

where X is a covariate that is not included in the matching procedure but is instead included as a
“control.” 38 For this estimation, it can be shown that the coefficient for X at the point X =
E(XOS) reflects a weighted average of the slope coefficients that would be estimated within the
treatment and control groups separately. 39
In the case of an identical linear treatment effect illustrated in Panel A of Figure B1, the
estimated coefficient on the treatment indicator will provide an unbiased estimate of the average
treatment effect (i.e., E[Y1 | D = 1, X] – E[Y0 | D = 0, X]). This occurs because the slope
coefficients are identical for both the treatment and control groups and can be seen from the
expression for γ, which is the estimate of the treatment effect in equation (B1). The covariate in
the regression essentially adjusts the estimated treatment and control means to the mean value of
the covariate in the overlapping support, XOS (although any value in the overlapping support will
provide identical estimates in this case).
In the case of a non-identical linear treatment effect, illustrated in Panel B of Figure B1, the
coefficient estimate of the treatment indicator from equation (B1) will yield a biased estimate of
the treatment effect, γ. This biased estimate occurs because the estimated slope coefficient in
38

For this example, we assume a linear functional form for expositional purposes only. The issues we discuss in
this section generalize to any specific functional form estimation of a pooled, partial-match regression setting with
additional controls.
39
Specifically, β = ρβ1 + (1 – ρ)β0, where ρ and (1 – ρ) is the fraction of the pooled sample that is from the treatment
(control) group, respectively, and β0 and β1 represent the within-control and within-treatment sample slope
coefficients, respectively. The average treatment effect is evaluated at point E(XOS), since it is the expected value
within the region of overlapping support for X.
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equation (B1) is the weighted-average pooled estimate for both the treatment and control
samples, and this pooled estimate is not equal to the actual slope for either of the samples, so the
estimated counterfactual is incorrect. In the particular case illustrated in Panel B, the estimated
treatment effect from equation (B1) will underestimate the true, average treatment effect.
Conversely, the estimate of the control on the outcome will be overstated because a portion of
the treatment effect will be misattributed to the control. 40 A solution to this problem (similar to
the test of parallel lines in traditional analysis of covariance) is to alter equation (B1) to
incorporate a separate intercept and slope for each sample and estimate: 41
Yi = α + γDi + βXi + δDi · Xi + εi.

(B2)

If the researcher can correctly specify the functional form linking X and Y (e.g., linear over the
entire range of X), the transformation from equation (B1) to equation (B2) will provide an
unbiased estimate for the treatment effect.
Finally, the case of a non-identical, non-linear treatment effect is illustrated in Panel C of
Figure B1. It can easily be seen that estimating a model similar to equation (B1) will almost
never provide an unbiased estimate of the desired treatment effect. In the unlikely case that the
underlying nonlinear structural model is known, the functions depicted in Panel C can be
estimated and the treatment effect can be evaluated at any point, but not by using linear
regression. Fortunately, the average treatment effect can be estimated with a matched pair
research design, as shown in Appendix A.

40

The situation can also be reversed, depending on the relationship between the control covariate and the outcome
in the treatment and control subsamples. It can easily be the case that the true average treatment effect is overstated
because part of the effect of the control on the outcome is misattributed to the treatment. The key point is that the
coefficient on the indicator variable in equation (A5) is not the correct estimate for the treatment effect.
41
Although this is a simple estimation modification, none of the papers discussed in Table 1 examine whether the
slopes on the covariates differ across the treatment and control groups.
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The discussion above shows that the addition of “control” variables in a regression
framework may not adequately control for the effect of confounding variables on the outcome of
interest. In particular, Panel A of Figure B1 illustrates the highly specialized case in which this
approach will provide an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect. However, this
outcome requires a constant slope linking X to Y across groups. Panels B and C of Figure B1
illustrate how, in the more general case, modeling the relationship as linear results in a biased
estimate of the treatment effect. In general, a matched research design (in which the match is
performed along all relevant, observable dimensions) will provide a more robust estimate of the
average treatment effect. The only case in which the regression approach can dominate the
propensity-score matched design occurs when the structural model linking the outcome variable
to the covariates is known and can be fully specified. However, knowledge of the underlying
structural model is extremely unlikely, and misspecification of this structural model can result in
additional sources of bias in the estimates of the treatment effect.
.
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Figure B1: Inferring Causal Effects Without Covariate Balance
Panel A.

Figure B1: Inferring Causal Effects Without Covariate Balance
Panel B.
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Figure B1: Inferring Causal Effects Without Covariate Balance
Panel C.

This figure depicts a nonlinear relationship between the dependent and independent variables (i.e., X and Y, respectively) for
both the treatment and control samples. The average treatment effect is appropriately evaluated at the average of the
overlapping support. Matching accomplishes this task by using only observations from the treatment and control samples in
the region of overlapping support. Linear regression with a treatment indicator estimates a linear projection over the entire
support of both the treatment and control distributions and assumes an identical slope, but different intercepts for the two
samples. In this example, the average treatment effect estimated from linear regression will underestimate the average
treatment effect.

Appendix C
Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Data Source

EqIncQuint

the quintile ranking of the CEO’s portfolio delta for which quintiles
are computed annually from the cross-sectional distribution of
portfolio deltas. Portfolio delta is calculated as the change in the
risk-neutral dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1%
change in the firm’s stock price

Equilar

Leverage

the ratio of total debt to market value of assets computed as (data9 +
data34)/((data199 · data25) + data9)

Compustat

MarketCap

the market value of equity computed as (data199 · data25)

Compustat

Idiosyncrisk

the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific regression of
monthly returns on the monthly return to the CRSP value-weighted
portfolio index using the previous 36 months (and requiring at least
12 months) of observations (Core and Guay, 1999)

CRSP

MkttoBook

the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity
computed as ((data199 * data25)/data216)

Compustat

Tenure

the CEO’s tenure with the firm in years

Equilar

OutsideChmn

a dichotomous variable that equals one if the chairman of the Board
of Directors is an outsider and zero otherwise

Equilar

OutsideLdDir

a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm has appointed a
lead independent director and zero otherwise

Equilar

CEOApptdOutsDirs

the fraction of outside directors appointed by the CEO; calculated as
the number of outside directors whose tenure is less than the CEO’s
tenure, scaled by the total number of directors

Equilar

StaggeredBd

a dichotomous variable that equals one if the corporate directors
have staggered terms and zero otherwise

Equilar

PctOldOutsDirs

the number of outside directors who are at least 69 years old scaled
by the total number of directors

Equilar

PctBusyOutsDirs

the number of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least
two boards scaled by the total number of directors

Equilar

PctFoundingDirs

the number of directors who are founders of the firm scaled by the
total number of directors

Equilar

OutsideDirHolds

the number of shares held by outside directors scaled by the total
number of shares outstanding

Equilar

NumberDirs

the number of directors on the board

Equilar

PctFinExpsAud

the number of directors with financial expertise who serve on the
audit committee scaled by the total number of directors. Financial
experts are directors who have experience as CEO, CFO, financial
accountant, or auditor, or who have been licensed as a Certified
Public or Chartered Accountant. This variable is manually coded

Equilar
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from detailed biographical data
DirCompMix

the ratio of total dollar equity compensation to total equity plus cash
compensation for non-executive directors

Equilar

NumberInstOwns

the number of institutional owners of the firm’s shares

CDA/Spectrum

NumBlockhldrs

the number of institutional owners that own at least 5% of the firm’s
outstanding shares

CDA/Spectrum

Activists

the number of institutional owners denoted as activists. Activist
shareholders are identified as CDA/Spectrum manager numbers
12000, 12100, 12120, 18740, 38330, 81590, 49050, 54360, 57500,
58650, 63600, 63850, 63895, 66550, 66610, 66635, 82895, 83360,
90803, and 93405 (Cremers and Nair, 2005; Larcker, Richardson,
and Tuna, 2007).

CDA/Spectrum
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Figure 1
Accounting Irregularities: Frequency Distributions
Frequency of observed Accounting Irregularities for each equity-incentive quintile
(Contemporaneous n = 13,706; One Year Ahead n = 10,773)
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Accounting Irregularity frequency is presented for each quintile of CEO equity incentives. CEO equity incentives is
measured as the portfolio delta (PortDelta), which is the change in the risk-neutral dollar value of the CEO’s equity
portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s stock price (Core and Guay, 1999). To compute PortDelta, the value of
stock and restricted stock is assumed to change dollar-for-dollar with changes in the price of the underlying stock.
The value of stock options is assumed to change according to the option’s delta, which is the derivative of its BlackScholes value with respect to the price of the underlying stock (See Core and Guay, 2002). Black-Scholes
parameters are computed using methods similar to Core and Guay (2002). Specifically, annualized volatility is
calculated using continuously compounded monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 12 months
of returns). The risk-free rate is calculated using an interpolated interest rate on a Treasury note with the same
maturity (to the closest month) as the remaining life of the option multiplied by 0.7 to account for the prevalence of
early-exercise. Dividend Yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past 12 months scaled by the stock price
at the beginning of the month. Contemporaneous Irregularities are those that occur in the same fiscal year of CEO
equity incentives measurement. One Year Ahead Irregularities are those that occur in the fiscal year that follows
CEO equity-incentive measurement.
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Table 1
Summary of Prior Literature
Study

Primary Equity
Incentives Proxy

Accounting
Irregularities Proxy

Unit of
Analysis

Research Design

Sample

Observed
Association

Baber, Kang,
Liang (2007)

Compensation Mix,
Exercisable Options
scaled by Shares
Outstanding

Restatements

CEO

Matched pair (year,
industry, exchange, assets)
logistic regression

193 firm-years
plus matches,
1997-2002

None

Harris and
Bromiley (2007)

Option and Bonus
Value scaled by
Total Compensation
Value

Restatements

CEO

Matched pair (year,
industry, sales) conditional
logistic regression

434 firm-years
plus matches,
1997-2002

Positive for Option
Value scaled by
Total Compensation
Value

Larcker,
Richardson, Tuna
(2007)

Compensation Mix

Abnormal Accruals,
Restatements

CEO

OLS regression, Pooled
logistic regression

1,484 firm-years,
118 firm-years
plus all other
firm-year
observations,
2002-2003

Positive, None

Efendi,
Srivastava,
Swanson (2007)

Component Value,
Option Intrinsic
Value, Option Delta

Restatements, Severe
Restatements

CEO

Matched pair (year,
industry, assets) logistic
regression, ordered logistic
regression

95 firm-years plus
matches, 20012002

Positive for option
intrinsic value and
option delta

Erickson,
Hanlon, Maydew
(2006)

Portfolio Delta

AAERs

Top 5 execs

Matched firms (year,
industry, assets) logistic
regression

50 firm-years plus
matches, 19962003

None

Johnson, Ryan,
Tian (2009)

Portfolio Delta and
Component Deltas

AAERs

Top 5 execs
and CEO
only

Matched pair (year,
industry, revenues)
conditional logistic
regression

53 firm-years plus
matches, 19922001

Positive only for
incentives related to
unrestricted stock

Table 1 (continued)
Summary of Prior Literature
Study

Primary Equity
Incentives Proxy

Accounting
Irregularities Proxy

Unit of
Analysis

Research Design

Sample

Observed
Association

Burns, Kedia
(2006)

Portfolio Delta and
Component Deltas

Restatements,
Restatement
Magnitude

CEO

Pooled logistic regression,
Pooled OLS regression

266 firm-years
plus all other
ExecuComp
firm-years,
1995-2002

Positive only for
incentives related
to stock options

Bergstresser,
Philippon (2006)

Incentive Ratio
(Portfolio Delta
scaled by
compensation)

Discretionary
Accruals

CEO

OLS regression

4,761 firmyears, 19942000

Positive

O’Connor, Priem,
Coombs, Gilley
(2006)

Black Scholes
Option Value

Restatements

CEO

Matched pair (year,
industry, sales, income,
option vesting schedules)

65 firm-years
plus matches,
2000-2004

Positive if (1) CEO
is board chair and
other board
members do not
receive options, or
(2) CEO is not
board chair and
other board
members receive
options

Cheng, Warfield
(2005)

Component
Holdings scaled by
shares outstanding

Meet / Just Beat
Expectations,
Abnormal Accruals

CEO

Pooled Logistic regression,
Pooled OLS

4,301 firmyears, 6,307
firm-years,
1993-2000

Positive only for
unexercisable
options and stock
holdings
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Accounting Irregularities, CEO Equity
Incentives, and Firm Characteristics
Panel A. Accounting Irregularities (n = 13,706)
Variable
Manipulation Restatement

Accounting Lawsuit

AAER

Period
Pooled
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Pooled
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Pooled
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Number of Firms

Percentage

464
17
69
96
203
79
464
122
98
118
83
43
157
50
48
35
18
6

3.4%
0.1%
0.5%
0.7%
1.5%
0.6%
3.4%
0.9%
0.7%
0.9%
0.6%
0.3%
1.2%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.0%

Restatement data are obtained from Glass-Lewis & Co., which comprehensively collects restatement information
from SEC filings, press releases, and other public data. We identify accounting restatements between 2001 and
2005 that relate to perceived reporting manipulation classified as accounting fraud, an SEC investigation, a
securities class action suit, improper reserve allowances, improper revenue recognition, or improper expense
recognition. We code a restatement incident as the first fiscal year in which improper accounting occurred that
subsequently required restatement.
Accounting lawsuits are obtained from a database provided by Woodruff-Sawyer and Co. that records class
action lawsuit periods between 2001 and 2005. These lawsuits allege earnings estimate improprieties, financial
misrepresentation, failure to adhere to GAAP, or restatement of earnings. We code a lawsuit incident as the
first fiscal year in which the firm is named in a lawsuit damage period.
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) are identified from the comprehensive AAER
listing provided on the SEC website for allegation periods between 2001 and 2005. These allegations cite
earnings-estimate improprieties, financial misrepresentation, or failure to adhere to GAAP. We code an AAER
incident as the first fiscal year in which the SEC alleges accounting manipulation occurred, as detailed in the
Enforcement Release.

Table 2 (continued)

Panel B. CEO Equity Incentives (n =10,773)
Variable
PortDelta

Period

EqIncQuint = 1

EqIncQuint = 2

Pooled
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Mean
24,980
25,999
17,086
25,841
28,628
26,072

Mean
88,124
91,085
62,607
94,731
99,706
91,802

Median
24,357
27,159
16,875
25,213
27,830
26,110

Median
84,941
87,636
60,660
91,931
97,226
89,460

EqIncQuint = 3
Mean
210,928
224,167
153,596
227,433
230,843
218,183

Median
204,436
222,667
149,491
224,623
223,186
216,843

EqIncQuint = 4
Mean
519,365
537,664
400,245
549,970
572,769
536,657

Median
489,012
501,469
379,358
518,465
548,654
498,068

EqIncQuint = 5
Mean
4,819,973
5,117,285
4,274,464
4,829,008
4,994,529
4,930,282

Median
1,822,611
2,114,765
1,412,645
1,863,581
1,963,088
1,879,171

CEO equity incentives are measured as the portfolio delta (PortDelta), which is the change in the risk-neutral dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio
for a 1% change in the firm’s stock price (Core and Guay, 1999). To compute PortDelta, the value of stock and restricted stock is assumed to change
dollar-for-dollar with changes in the price of the underlying stock. The value of stock options is assumed to change according to the option’s delta,
which is the derivative of its Black-Scholes value with respect to the price of the underlying stock (See Core and Guay, 2002). Black-Scholes
parameters are computed using methods similar to Core and Guay (2002). Specifically, annualized volatility is calculated using continuously
compounded monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 12 months of returns). The risk-free rate is calculated using an interpolated
interest rate on a Treasury note with the same maturity (to the closest month) as the remaining life of the option multiplied by 0.7 to account for the
prevalence of early exercise. Dividend Yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past 12 months scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the
month.

Table 2 (continued)

Panel C. Firm Characteristics (n =10,773)
Variable
Leverage
MarketCap
Idiosyncrisk
MkttoBook
Tenure
OutsideChmn
OutsideLdDir
CEOApptdOutsDirs
StaggeredBd
PctOldOutsDirs
PctBusyOutsDirs
PctFoundingDirs
OutsideDirHolds
NumberDirs
PctFinExpsAud
DirCompMix
NumInstOwns
NumBlockhldrs
Activists

Mean
0.204
3,775
0.152
2.865
6.862
0.132
0.194
0.700
0.580
0.143
0.250
0.034
0.013
8.600
0.674
0.495
133
1.886
0.013

Median
0.144
551
0.130
2.120
4.800
0.000
0.000
0.800
1.000
0.125
0.222
0.000
0.003
8.000
0.667
0.531
89
2.000
0.000

Std. Dev.
0.231
16,791
0.088
2.853
7.235
0.339
0.395
0.329
0.494
0.142
0.209
0.075
0.033
2.633
0.244
0.319
151
1.530
0.115

Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets computed from Compustat as (data9 + data34)/((data199 *
data25) + data9). MarketCap is the market value of equity computed from Compustat as (data199 * data25).
Idiosyncrisk is the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific regression of monthly returns on the monthly
return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio index (Core and Guay, 1999). At least 12 and no more than 36 monthly
return observations are required for estimation. MkttoBook is the market value of equity divided by the book value of
equity computed from Compustat as ((data199 * data25)/data216). Tenure is the CEO’s tenure with the firm in years,
as provided by Equilar. OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board chairman is delineated as
an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. OutsideLdDir is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the lead
independent director is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. CEOApptdOutsDirs is the number of
outside directors whose tenure is less than the CEO’s tenure, scaled by the total number of directors. StaggeredBd is a
dichotomous variable that equals one if Equilar delineates the board service terms as staggered and is zero otherwise.
PctOldOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who are at least 69 years old to total directors. PctBusyOutsDirs is the
ratio of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards to total directors. PctFoundingDirs is the
ratio of directors who are founding firm members to total directors. OutsideDirHolds is the sum of shares held by
outside directors to total shares outstanding. NumberDirs is the number of directors on the board. PctFinExpsAud is
the ratio of directors with financial expertise who serve on the audit committee to total directors. Directors are
classified as financial experts if they have experience as CEO, CFO, financial accountant, or auditor, or if they have
been licensed as a Certified Public or Chartered Accountant. DirCompMix is the ratio of total dollar equity
compensation to total equity plus cash compensation for non-executive directors. NumberInstOwns is the number of
institutional owners delineated in the CDA/Spectrum database. NumBlockhldrs is the number of institutional owners
that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. Activists is the number of institutional owners denoted as activists by
Cremers and Nair (2005) and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).

Table 3
Propensity-Score Estimation Using Conditional Ordered Logistic Regression
Dependent Variable =
EqIncQuint
Leverage
Log(MarketCap)
Log(Idiosyncrisk)
MkttoBook
Log(1 + Tenure)
OutsideChmn
OutsideLdDir
CEOApptdOutsDirs
StaggeredBd
PctOldOutsDirs
PctBusyOutsDirs
PctFoundingDirs
OutsideDirHolds
Log(1+NumberDirs)
PctFinExpsAud
DirCompMix
Log(1+NumInstOwns)
Log(1+NumBlockhldrs)
Log(1+Activists)
Intercept EqIncQuint 1Æ 2
Intercept EqIncQuint 2Æ 3
Intercept EqIncQuint 3Æ 4
Intercept EqIncQuint 4Æ 5
CEO-firm-year obs.
Adj. Pseudo-R2

Pred.
−
+
+
+
+
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
+
+
+
+

Avg. Coeff.
−0.398
1.524
0.111
0.033
0.734
−0.699
−0.302
1.027
−0.031
0.085
−0.002
3.015
3.912
−1.272
−0.006
0.298
−0.344
0.195
−0.673
4.524
6.334
7.882
9.672
10,773
0.273

Aggr. zStatistic
−3.938
41.320
2.438
4.083
32.190
−11.565
−3.861
15.844
−0.824
0.674
0.162
10.837
6.384
−13.427
−0.136
4.522
−6.737
5.432
−2.903
21.288
29.194
35.516
42.373

Yrs. With
Pos. Coeff.
0
4
4
4
4
0
0
4
2
2
2
4
4
0
2
4
0
4
0
4
4
4
4

Yrs. With
Neg. Coeff.
4
0
0
0
0
4
4
0
2
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
4
0
4
0
0
0
0

EqIncQuint is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO’s portfolio delta falls within the kth quintile of the crosssectional distribution of CEO deltas and equals zero otherwise. The portfolio delta is the change in dollar value of the CEO’s
equity portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s underlying stock price. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of
assets computed from Compustat as (data9 + data34)/((data199 * data25) + data9). MarketCap is the market value of equity
computed from Compustat as (data199 * data25). Idiosyncrisk is the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific
regression of monthly returns on the monthly return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio index (Core and Guay, 1999). At
least 12 and no more than 36 monthly return observations are required for estimation. MkttoBook is the market value of
equity divided by the book value of equity computed from Compustat as ((data199 * data25)/data216). Tenure is the CEO’s
tenure with the firm in years, as provided by Equilar. OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board
chairman is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. OutsideLdDir is a dichotomous variable that equals
one if the lead independent director is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. CEOApptdOutsDirs is the
number of outside directors whose tenure is less than the CEO’s tenure, scaled by the total number of directors. StaggeredBd
is a dichotomous variable that equals one if Equilar delineates the board service terms as staggered and is zero otherwise.
PctOldOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who are at least 69 years old to total directors. PctBusyOutsDirs is the ratio of
outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards to total directors. PctFoundingDirs is the ratio of directors
who are founding firm members to total directors. OutsideDirHolds is the sum of shares held by outside directors to total
shares outstanding. NumberDirs is the number of directors on the board. PctFinExpsAud is the ratio of directors with
financial expertise who serve on the audit committee to total directors. Directors are classified as financial experts if they
have experience as CEO, CFO, financial accountant, or auditor, or if they have been licensed as a Certified Public or
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Chartered Accountant. DirCompMix is the ratio of total dollar equity compensation to total equity plus cash compensation for
non-executive directors. NumberInstOwns is the number of institutional owners delineated in the CDA/Spectrum database.
NumBlockhldrs is the number of institutional owners that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. Activists is the number of
institutional owners denoted as activists by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).
The first column reports the average coefficient estimate across year-specific estimation from 2001 through 2005. The
second column reports an aggregate z-statistic, which is calculated as the sum of the individual annual z-statistics divided
by the square root of the number of years over which equation (2) is estimated. This aggregated z-statistic assumes that
each annual estimation is independent of the other estimations. The final two columns report the number of years for
which the year-specific coefficient is positive and negative, respectively. Adj. Pseudo R2 is the average McFadden’s
adjusted pseudo R2.

57

Table 4
Matched-Pair Frequencies for Equity-Incentive Quintiles
Frequencies of the dosage differences between the matched pairs
Control
Equity
Incentive
Quintile

Treatment Equity Incentive Quintile

1
2
3
4
5
Total

1

2

3

4

5

Total

0

670
0

188
821
0

25
442
786
0

0

670

1,009

1,253

71
130
404
1,022
0
1,627

954
1,393
1,190
1,022
0
4,559

Matched pairs are formed using the following distance metric:
Δi,j = ( PScorei − PScore j ) 2

if δi ≠ δj

(δ i − δ j ) 2

Δi,j =

∞

if δi = δj,

PScore is the propensity score computed from equation (1), δ is each observation’s equity incentive
treatment quintile, and i, j denote individual observations.
Matched pairs are identified through a nonbipartite algorithm to identify, across all possible
permutations, the minimum sum of pairwise distances,

∑Δ

i, j

for i ≠ j,

where each observation is paired

with another and observations can be used only once for matching.
Higher equity-incentive observations are labeled as treatment, and lower equity-incentive observations
are labeled as control.

Table 5
Covariate Balance Between the Matched Pairs
Test statistics of covariate distributions for the treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and the control (low CEO equity
incentives) groups (n = 4,559 matched pairs)

Leverage
Log(MarketCap)
Log(Idiosyncrisk)
MkttoBook
Log(1 + Tenure)
OutsideChmn
OutsideLdDir
CEOApptdOutsDirs
StaggeredBd
PctOldOutsDirs
PctBusyOutsDirs
PctFoundingDirs
OutsideDirHolds
Log(NumberDirs)
PctFinExpsAud
DirCompMix
Log(NumInstOwns)
Log(NumBlockhldrs)
Log(Activists)

Mean
Treatment

Mean
Control

Median
Treatment

Median
Control

t-Test
Difference
p-Value

KS Bootstrap
Difference
p-Value

0.205
6.322
-2.045
2.785
1.640
0.122
0.157
0.703
0.597
0.152
0.239
0.036
0.014
2.222
0.745
0.495
4.359
0.895
0.009

0.200
6.297
-2.018
2.770
1.625
0.121
0.160
0.707
0.594
0.152
0.242
0.035
0.014
2.222
0.750
0.507
4.368
0.917
0.010

0.149
6.234
-2.059
2.113
1.740
0.000
0.000
0.800
1.000
0.125
0.200
0.000
0.003
2.197
1.000
0.549
4.466
1.099
0.000

0.152
6.210
-2.024
2.028
1.705
0.000
0.000
0.800
1.000
0.133
0.200
0.000
0.003
2.197
1.000
0.537
4.466
1.099
0.000

0.281
0.417
0.017
0.794
0.445
0.898
0.667
0.556
0.749
0.945
0.450
0.436
0.854
0.927
0.531
0.075
0.640
0.067
0.647

0.407
0.179
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.910
0.687
0.313
0.747
0.252
0.153
0.000
0.001
0.758
0.540
0.000
0.822
0.009
0.697

Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets computed from Compustat as (data9 + data34)/((data199 * data25) + data9).
MarketCap is the market value of equity computed from Compustat as (data199 * data25). Idiosyncrisk is the standard deviation of
residuals from a firm-specific regression of monthly returns on the monthly return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio index (Core
and Guay, 1999). At least 12 and no more than 36 monthly return observations are required for estimation. MkttoBook is the market
value of equity divided by the book value of equity computed from Compustat as ((data199 * data25)/data216). Tenure is the CEO’s
tenure with the firm in years, as provided by Equilar. OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board chairman is
delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. OutsideLdDir is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the lead
independent director is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. CEOApptdOutsDirs is the number of outside directors
whose tenure is less than the CEO’s tenure, scaled by the total number of directors. StaggeredBd is a dichotomous variable that equals
one if Equilar delineates the board service terms as staggered and is zero otherwise. PctOldOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors
who are at least 69 years old to total directors. PctBusyOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least
two boards to total directors. PctFoundingDirs is the ratio of directors who are founding firm members to total directors.
OutsideDirHolds is the sum of shares held by outside directors to total shares outstanding. NumberDirs is the number of directors on
the board. PctFinExpsAud is the ratio of directors with financial expertise who serve on the audit committee to total directors. Directors
are classified as financial experts if they have experience as CEO, CFO, financial accountant, or auditor, or if they have been licensed as
a Certified Public or Chartered Accountant. DirCompMix is the ratio of total dollar equity compensation to total equity plus cash
compensation for non-executive directors. NumberInstOwns is the number of institutional owners delineated in the CDA/Spectrum
database. NumBlockhldrs is the number of institutional owners that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. Activists is the number of
institutional owners denoted as activists by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).
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Table 6
Accounting Irregularities
Frequency of observed accounting irregularities for the treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and the control (low CEO equity incentives) groups

Panel A. Accounting Manipulation-Related Restatements
EqIncQuintt
T
C
5
4
5
3
5
2
5
1
4
3
4
2
4
1
3
2
3
1
2
1
Pooled
Pooled
DiffEqIncQuintt
T-C
4
3
2
1

T
38
8
4
0
29
16
0
36
7
23
161

T
0
4
31
126

C
40
11
4
3
38
17
0
32
8
21
174

Restatement Frequencyt
p
$IncentT
Γ
1,582,081
0.910
0.646
0.724
0.248
472,528
0.328
1.000
1.000
204,615
0.716
1.000
83,670
0.880
0.512
429,801

C
3
4
36
131

Restatement Frequencyt
p
$IncentT
Γ
0.248
0.724
0.625
0.803
368,860

$IncentC
501,198

222,198

96,106
29,833
147,548

$IncentC

167,047

T
31
15
2
2
29
11
1
35
9
24
159

T
2
3
35
119

C
55
16
4
1
33
11
0
44
4
21
189

C
1
4
31
153

Restatement Frequencyt+1
p
$IncentT
Γ
0.013
1.37
1,529,602
1.000
0.683
1.000
0.703
450,777
0.831
1.000
0.368
185,660
0.267
0.766
78,978
0.120
713,271
Restatement Frequencyt+1
$IncentT
p
Γ
1.000
1.000
0.712
0.045
1.04
371,114

$IncentC
528,784

223,529

91,726
25,552
178,435

$IncentC

162,026

Table 6 (continued)
Accounting Irregularities
Frequency of observed accounting irregularities for the treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and the control (low CEO equity incentives) groups

Panel B. Accounting-Related Shareholder Lawsuits
EqIncQuintt
T
C
5
4
5
3
5
2
5
1
4
3
4
2
4
1
3
2
3
1
2
1
Pooled
Pooled
DiffEqIncQuintt
T-C
4
3
2
1

T
42
6
4
4
31
17
1
31
0
7
143

T
4
5
23
111

C
65
16
8
5
36
17
0
24
2
14
187

Lawsuit Frequencyt
p
$IncentT
Γ
1,596,888
0.033
1.13
0.055
1.49
0.386
1.000
451,960
0.625
0.864
1.000
184,689
0.418
0.480
77,684
0.190
0.018
1.06
630,373

C
5
8
35
139

Lawsuit Frequencyt
p
$IncentT
Γ
1.000
0.579
0.149
0.088
1.01
568,488

$IncentC
527,222

226,679

74,294
24,576
189,108

$IncentC

276,337
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T
31
7
5
4
22
11
0
12
1
5
98

T
4
5
19
70

C
41
22
5
1
17
13
0
26
1
7
133

Lawsuit Frequencyt+1
P
$IncentT
Γ
0.289
1,474,446
0.009
3.15
0.752
0.371
0.522
401,866
0.838
1.000
0.035
1.41
170,823
0.480
0.773
65,287
0.025
1.07
713,271

C
1
5
36
91

Lawsuit Frequencyt+1
$IncentT
P
Γ
0.371
0.752
1.30
0.031
0.115
581,103

$IncentC
524,969

183,203

75,432
24,233
178,435

$IncentC

265,093

Table 6 (continued)
Accounting Irregularities
Frequency of observed Accounting Irregularities for the treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and the control (low CEO equity incentives) groups
Panel C. Accounting-Related SEC Enforcement Actions (AAERs)
EqIncQuintt
T
C
5
4
5
3
5
2
5
1
4
3
4
2
4
1
3
2
3
1
2
1
Pooled
Pooled
DiffEqIncQuintt
T-C
4
3
2
1

T
9
2
0
2
10
4
0
10
1
6
44

T
2
0
7
35

C
29
5
2
1
10
11
0
11
1
3
73

AAER Frequencyt
p
$IncentT
Γ
1,636,782
0.002
6.26
0.450
0.480
1.000
439,622
0.823
0.121
0.000
183,834
1.000
0.480
72,381
0.505
0.010
1.32
557,843

C
1
2
17
53

AAER Frequencyt
p
$IncentT
Γ
1.000
0.480
0.066
1.29
504,338
0.070
1.05

$IncentC
477,647

243,417

81,296
23,258
153,427

$IncentC

249,946

T
7
3
0
2
9
3
1
6
1
4
36

T
2
1
7
26

C
19
0
1
0
5
6
0
12
0
3
46

AAER Frequencyt+1
P
$IncentT
Γ
0.031
1.80
1,523,063
0.248
1.000
0.480
0.423
381,774
0.505
1.000
0.239
177,221
1.000
1.000
60,539
0.320
406,358

C
0
1
6
39

AAER Frequencyt+1
$IncentT
P
Γ
0.480
0.480
1.000
0.137
372,203

$IncentC
514,917

238,192

72,115
19,342
120,498

$IncentC

212,802

EqIncQuint is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO’s portfolio delta falls within the kth quintile of the cross-sectional distribution of CEO deltas and
equals zero otherwise. The portfolio delta is the change in dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s underlying stock price.
DiffEqIncQuint is the difference between EqIncQuint for the Treatment and Control groups. Each cell contains the discordant pair frequency of observing an
accounting irregularity. In other words, the frequency count in the Treatment category denotes the number of observations for which there is an observed accounting
irregularity in the treatment group but no observed accounting irregularity in the control group. p-values are computed using a McNemar’s non-parametric test for
differences in frequency across distributions. Γ values quantify the amount of hidden bias necessary to alter the statistical significance (p = 0.10) that results from the
assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores have an equal probability of receiving treatment. $Incent is the median portfolio delta computed for
the Treatment and Control matched observations reported in the frequency cells. $Incent is reported only when DiffEqIncQuint = 1 (and for Pooled data), since this
reflects the minimum equity-incentive distance and there is sufficient sample size for tests of median differences. All $IncentT - $IncentC differences are statistically
significant at the 1% level (two-tailed) using a Kruskal-Wallis test.
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Table 7
Sensitivity Analysis: Conditional Logistic Regression
Panel A. Regression Estimates

EqIncQuint2 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1
EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint5 = 1
Matched CEO-firm-year obs.
Adj. Pseudo-R2

Restatementt
Coeff.
z-Stat

Lawsuitt
Coeff.
z-Stat

AAERt
Coeff.
z-Stat

0.037
−0.014
−0.288
−0.406

−0.219
−0.193
−0.012
−0.613

−0.794
−0.412
−0.174
−1.382

Tests of Coefficients
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint3 = 1
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1
EqIncQuint4 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1

EqIncQuint2 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1
EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint5 = 1
Matched CEO- firm-year obs.
Adj. Pseudo-R2
Tests of Coefficients
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint3 = 1
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1
EqIncQuint4 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1

0.10
−0.06
−0.66
−0.94
770
0.144

−0.60
−0.67
−0.03
−1.35
798
0.198

−0.72
−0.36
−0.17
−1.09
262
0.429

p-Value
0.89
0.38
0.20
0.47
0.24
0.74

p-Value
0.90
0.51
0.23
0.40
0.12
0.02

p-Value
0.38
0.32
0.52
0.75
0.31
0.13

Restatementt+1
Coeff.
z-Stat

Lawsuitt+1
Coeff.
z-Stat

AAERt+1
Coeff.
z-Stat

−0.372
−0.073
−0.108
−0.767

−0.076
−0.163
−0.115
−0.263

1.666
−0.691
2.258
0.437

−1.41
−0.24
−0.33
−1.79
668
0.095
p-Value
0.89
0.38
0.20
0.47
0.24
0.74

−0.17
−0.33
−0.20
−0.58
514
0.184
p-Value
0.81
0.93
0.69
0.90
0.76
0.71

1.19
−0.39
1.13
0.24
176
0.506
p-Value
0.01
0.60
0.40
0.00
0.19
0.12

Table 7
Sensitivity Analysis: Conditional Logistic Regression (continued)
Panel B. Covariate Balance Between Irregularity and Matched Observations
Table 5
Median
Trt.-Cntrl.

PortDelta
Leverage
Log(MarketCap)
Log(Idiosyncrisk)
MkttoBook
Log(1 + Tenure)
OutsideChmn
OutsideLdDir
CEOApptdOutsDirs
StaggeredBd
PctOldOutsDirs
PctBusyOutsDirs
PctFoundingDirs
OutsideDirHolds
Log(NumberDirs)
PctFinExpsAud
DirCompMix
Log(NumInstOwns)
Log(NumBlockhldrs)
Log(Activists)
Number of pairs

1.193***
0.000***
0.041***
−0.036***
0.057***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
4,559

Restatementt
Median
Irreg.-Match

−0.291***
0.034***
0.000***
0.059***
−0.312***
−0.261***
0.000***
0.000***
−0.066***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.068***
0.000***
−0.004***
0.063***
0.000***
0.000***
385

Restatementt+1
Median
Irreg.-Match

−0.117***
0.019***
0.002***
0.041***
−0.277***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.015***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.057***
0.000***
0.000***
334

Lawsuitt
Median
Irreg.-Match

−0.209***
0.010***
0.003***
0.118***
−0.105***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.035***
0.079***
0.000***
0.000***
399

Lawsuitt+1
Median
Irreg.-Match

0.029***
0.000***
0.002***
0.116***
−0.026***
0.169***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.077***
0.083***
0.000***
0.000***
257

AAERt
Median
Irreg.-Match

−0.248***
0.027***
0.002***
0.134***
−0.320***
−0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
−0.000***
−0.033***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
−0.050***
0.141***
0.000***
0.000***
131

AAERt+1
Median
Irreg.-Match

0.050***
0.019***
0.002***
0.127***
−0.082***
0.084***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
−0.054***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
−0.025***
0.115***
0.000***
0.000***
88

EqIncQuint is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO’s portfolio delta (PortDelta) falls within the kth quintile of the cross-sectional distribution of CEO
deltas and equals zero otherwise. PortDelta is the change in dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s underlying stock price. Leverage is
the ratio of total debt to market value of assets computed from Compustat as (data9 + data34)/((data199 * data25) + data9). MarketCap is the market value of equity
computed from Compustat as (data199 * data25). Idiosyncrisk is the standard deviation of residuals from a firm-specific regression of monthly returns on the monthly
return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio index (Core and Guay, 1999). At least 12 and no more than 36 monthly return observations are required for estimation.
MkttoBook is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity computed from Compustat as ((data199 * data25)/data216). Tenure is the CEO’s tenure
with the firm in years, as provided by Equilar. OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the board chairman is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and
is zero otherwise. OutsideLdDir is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the lead independent director is delineated as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise.
CEOApptdOutsDirs is the number of outside directors whose tenure is less than the CEO’s tenure, scaled by the total number of directors. StaggeredBd is a dichotomous

variable that equals one if Equilar delineates the board service terms as staggered and is zero otherwise. PctOldOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who are at least
69 years old to total directors. PctBusyOutsDirs is the ratio of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards to total directors. PctFoundingDirs is
the ratio of directors who are founding firm members to total directors. OutsideDirHolds is the sum of shares held by outside directors to total shares outstanding.
NumberDirs is the number of directors on the board. PctFinExpsAud is the ratio of directors with financial expertise who serve on the audit committee to total directors.
DirCompMix is the ratio of total dollar equity compensation to total equity plus cash compensation for non-executive directors. NumberInstOwns is the number of
institutional owners delineated in the CDA/Spectrum database. NumBlockhldrs is the number of institutional owners that own at least 5% of outstanding shares. Activists
is the number of institutional owners denoted as activists by Cremers and Nair (2005) and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007). *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, from a KS bootstrap test of median differences.
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Table 8
Sensitivity Analysis: Early Sample
Panel A. Regression estimates
AAERt
Coeff.
EqIncQuint2 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1
EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint5 = 1
CEO- firm-year obs.
Adj. Pseudo-R2
Estimation Method
Tests of Coefficients
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint3 = 1
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint2 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint4 = 1
EqIncQuint3 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1
EqIncQuint4 = 1 ≠ EqIncQuint5 = 1

−0.155
0.642
0.099
1.063

AAERt
z-Stat

Coeff.

z-Stat

−0.21
0.87
0.13
1.36
150
0.191
Logistic

−0.040
1.066
1.158
3.414

−0.04
1.00
0.97
2.30
150
0.412
Cond. Logistic

p-Value
0.25
0.72
0.09
0.39
0.50
0.12

p-Value
0.25
0.23
0.01
0.91
0.02
0.02

Table 8
Sensitivity Analysis: Early Sample (continued)
Panel B. AAER frequency for treatment (high CEO equity incentives) and control
(low CEO equity incentives) groups, matched by propensity score
EqIncQuint
T
C
5
4
5
3
5
2
5
1
4
3
4
2
4
1
3
2
3
1
2
1
Pooled
Pooled

AAER Frequency
T
C
p
Γ
16
5 0.029
1.68
0
0 1.000
0
0 1.000
0
0 1.000
3
6 0.505
0
0 1.000
0
0 1.000
3
2 1.000
0
0 1.000
2
13 0.010 11.92
24
26 0.888

DiffEqIncQuint
T-C
4
3
2
1

AAER Frequency
T
C
p
0
0 1.000
0
0 1.000
0
0 1.000
24 26 0.888

Γ

Regression statistics in Panel A derive from logistic or conditional logistic regression of AAER = β1 +

5

∑β
k =2

k

EqIncQuintk + β6 CEO=CHAIR + β7 NUMMTGS + β8 FINANCING + β9 LEVERAGE + β10 MARKET VALUE OF
EQUITY + β11 ALTMAN’S Z + β12 BOOK TO MARKET + β13 EARNINGS TO PRICE + β14 RET ON ASSETS + β15
SALES GROWTH + β16 AGE OF FIRM + β17 M&A IN FIRST YEAR OF FRAUD + β18 STOCK VOLATILITY + β19
CEO TENURE + β20 MISSING CEO TENURE + εi.
EqIncQuint is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO’s portfolio delta falls within the kth quintile of the
cross-sectional distribution of CEO deltas and equals zero otherwise. The portfolio delta is the change in dollar value
of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s underlying stock price. See Erickson, Hanlon, and
Maydew (2006) for other variable definitions.
Cells in Panel B contain the discordant pair frequency of observing an accounting irregularity. In other words, the
frequency count in the Treatment category denotes the number of observations where there is an observed accounting
irregularity in the treatment group but no observed accounting irregularity in the control group. p-values are
computed using a McNemar’s non-parametric test for differences in frequency across distributions. DiffEqIncQuint
is the difference between EqIncQuint for the Treatment and Control groups. Propensity scores are estimated through
logistic regression of EqIncQuint = β1 + β2 CEO=CHAIR + β3 NUMMTGS + β4 FINANCING + β5 LEVERAGE + β6
MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY + β7 ALTMAN’S Z + β8 BOOK TO MARKET + β9 EARNINGS TO PRICE + β10 RET
ON ASSETS + β11 SALES GROWTH + β12 AGE OF FIRM + β13 M&A IN FIRST YEAR OF FRAUD + β14 STOCK
VOLATILITY + β15 CEO TENURE + β16 MISSING CEO TENURE + εi.
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Γ values quantify the amount of hidden bias necessary to alter the statistical significance (p = 0.10) that results from the
assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores have an equal probability of receiving treatment.
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